

## Cloud Server Geolocating

Presentation at 19<sup>th</sup> FRUCT conference, Jyväskylä, Finland.

- Leo Hippeläinen, Ian Oliver, Shankar Lal
- Nokia Bell Labs, Security Research Team Espoo, Finland
- leo.hippelainen@nokia-bell-labs.com, leo.hippelainen@aalto.fi
- 2016-11-11



1 © Nokia 2016

Dependable *geographical location* detection of physical servers belonging to a **computing cloud**.

- Why this deserves attention?
- What can be done about it?






#### Some Examples of Data Privacy, Residency and Sovereignty

<b>Eegislations</b>		Principles		
European Union	General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)	<ul> <li>Privacy is a fundamental right.</li> <li>Trans border data transfers OK, as long as the involved countries also respect GDPR.</li> </ul>		
Australia & NZ	The Privacy Amendment Act	<ul> <li>Australian data sender must take reasonable steps to ensure that also the recipient will comply with the Australian Privacy Principles (APP).</li> </ul>		
Russia	Amendments to the Personal Data Law	<ul> <li>All personal data of Russian citizens must be stored in databases that reside within territory of the Russian Federation.</li> <li>Personal data can be duplicated to outside Russian borders, as long as Russian personal data laws are followed.</li> </ul>		
China	No comprehensive personal data protection law, instead scattered provisions. New security law just adopted.	Unless otherwise agreed or stated in regulations personal information must not be transferred to outside the territory of the People's Republic of China. Details of the new cyber security law not yet analyzed.		
USA	No federal personal data law, but many government policies and regulations	<ul> <li>Legal domain specific laws</li> <li>HIPAA (health records), PCI DSS (credit cards), etc.</li> </ul>		
3 © 2016 Nokia		CYBER TRUST		

#### The Data Residency Issue



How can a cloud customer verify that Data Center 3 is not employed?


4 © 2016 Nokia









## Analysing the Problem Domain

















CYBER TRUST











Research Challenges in Providing Geographical Trust

- 1. Cloud Service **Provider** wants to optimize utilization of server resources and still take into account geographical constraints.
- 2. Cloud Service **Customer** wants to verify that Cloud Service Provider respects geographical constraints.
- 3. Service **End User** wants to verify that his data is kept confidential and not copied to uncompliant jurisdictions.
- 4. External **Auditor** writes an audit report and for that needs to check the locations of cloud servers.
- 5. Possible geolocation cheating patterns of a dishonest Cloud Service **Provider**.
- 6. Possible geolocation cheating patterns of a dishonest Cloud Service **Customer**.



NOKIA Bell Labs



# Analysing the Solution Domain

Ingredients to Providing Location of a Cloud Server

Know trustfully the location of a trusted cloud server on Earth

What is the location of the data center?

In which data center the server exists? Can we trust the location information?

DIMECC Program CYBER TRUST




#### **Assumptions and Requirements**

for a Cloud Server Location Detection Solution

- Cost Awareness
- Dependability
- Node count
- Radio Signal Propagation
- Auditing
- Server Identifiers
- Server Mobility
- Geographical Location

Server's price 1K€ .. 10 K€ False positives: 0% >10000 servers per data center Data center in a Faraday cage Site visit possible Unique, e.g. serial number Minimal but can happen Not near jurisdiction border






**NOKIA** Bell Labs


CYBER TRUST

#### Location Detecting Techniques and Algorithms

#### Incomplete list (but this should contain all essential ones)












#### **Round Trip Time with Landmark based Location Detection** Physical distances > 500 km in the Internet

Distance-Bounding Protocols







**Provisioned Location Code based Location Detection** 


- Typically location HASH stored to a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) register.
  - or some other HSM (Hardware Security Module).
- Must be provisioned separately for every physical server => extra cost?
- How can we trust that data is correct?



Network Topology based Location Detection

- Servers have wired LAN.
  - Connected to LAN switch or router.
- Network topology can be detected.

• Network topology alone does not provide sufficient evidence.







Attestation Service based Location Detection

- Server's serial number -> location coordinates.
- Needs a third party trusted server.

- Difficult to maintain the database up-to-date.
- How can we trust that data is correct?





**Possible Radio Technologies** 

for Proximity and Distance Measurements

- RFID
- Bluetooth
- ZigBee
- Wi-Fi
- Cellular





#### Summary of Radio Signal based Location Detection Techniques

	Cost per server	Cost per reader	Nodes per reader	Range
RFID (active)	<5€	100€ (?)	No limit Sho	uld run experiments.
Bluetooth	<5€	20€	7 + 255 (piconet) Too	few nodes per piconet.
ZigBee	<5€	30€		uld run experiments.
Wi-Fi	<5€	50€	2007 Too	few nodes per AP.
Cellular	20€ (phone + SIM)	1000€ (?)	No limit Too ex	pensive, too long range.

Note: Shown prices are only educated guesses.





#### Conclusions

- There is need for dependable location detection of physical cloud servers.
- All techniques mentioned here have challenges with locating servers in to a data center site.
- Note: Trusted computing is a precondition to trusted geolocation information.
- Further research work:
  - Combining several locating techniques to increase trust.
  - Identify possible cheating patterns by cloud service providers.
  - Detect location of data and its replicas.





### NOKIA Bell Labs